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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Were the eight thefts charged in the information 
part of a single criminal episode so that three of them were 
properly joined for trial under Rule 9? 
2. Did defendant provide an adequate record on the 
issue of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument? 
3. Was the jury instructed on a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption in violation of State v. Chambers,. 20 Utah Adv. Rpt. 
14 (Oct. 21f 1985), and Francis v. Franklin, U.S. , 105 
S.Ct. 1965 (1985)? 
4. Was defendant's objection to the jury instruction 
that the jury may presume knowledge or belief that the items were 
stolen because defendant had received other stolen property 
within the preceeding year properly preserved for appeal? 
5. Did the trial court properly admit pawn cards 
representing other pawn transactions to show that defendant knew 
or believed the property at issue probably was stolen? 
* 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ROBERTO TARAFA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20561 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged witl i eight counts of theft by 
receiving, seven third-degree felonies, and a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1978). 
Five counts were dismissed without prejudice prior to preliminary 
hearing and three third-degree felonies were bound over for 
trial. 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft by 
receiving and acquitted of a third count, in a jury trial held 
February 19-21, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. Judge Frederick sentenced defendant on 
February 21, 19 85, to two indeterminate terms not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with eight counts of theft by 
receiving occurring on various dates between October 20, 1984 and 
November 14, 1984 (R. 1]-]5). At preliminary hearing, five of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the counts were dismissed without prejudice and defendant was 
bound over for trial on three counts occurring on October 27, 
November 3 and November 14 (R. 6-10). Prior to trial, defendant 
moved to sever the three remaining counts and the State moved to 
join the five counts previously dismissed with the three that 
remained (R. 21-22, 26). Both motions were denied (R. 36). 
On October 27, 1984, defendant sold a toolbox full of 
tools and a flute to the Midtown Pawnshop in Salt Lake City for 
$55 (R. 199-200, 203). Earlier that day, sometime between 9:00 
p.m. on the 26th and 1:00 a.m. on the 27th, a flute and the 
toolbox were stolen from an Orem home (T. 171-173) . The owner 
valued the toolbox at $300-$400 and an expert valued the flute at 
$275-320 (T. 193). 
Defendant lived in Provo at this time (R. 365) . Nelson 
Florez, a friend of defendant's, came by defendant's apartment in 
Provo and asked defendant to lend Florez his car and to drive 
with Florez to Salt Lake City, to pawn something (T. 366). 
Florez told defendant that he could get more money for items 
pawned in Salt Lake City and that he needed defendant to help him 
because he did not have any identification (T. 366). This 
occurred several times, at least seven or eight (T. 366) . Each 
time, defendant gave an outdated Salt Lake City address as his 
current address except on one occasion when he used an outdated 
Provo address from his driver license (T. 400, 402-404). 
On November 3, 1984, defendant sold a guitar and a ring 
at the Mission Pawnshop in Salt Lake City at Florez's request 
(T. 231-235). The guitar, a steel string Ventura, with a hard 
-2-
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c a r r y i n g c a s e , was s t o l e n from a Provo home in t h e evening hours 
of November 2 t o e a r l y morning on November 3 f 1984 (T. 218, 224) . 
There was c o n f l i c t i n g tes t imony on t h e f a i r market value of the 
g u i t a r and c a s e . The owner valued them a t about $330 (T. 225) . 
Defendan t ' s expe r t w i tne s s valued them a t about $17 5-185 
(T. 349) , whi le the S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l e x p e r t valued them a t a 
minimum of $300 (T. 354) . The j u ry found defendant not g u i l t y of 
t h i r d - d e g r e e felony t h e f t for t h i s pawn t r a n s a c t i o n (R. 81) . 
On November 14 , 1984, defendant sold a video c a s s e t t e 
recorder made up of two components a t P a h l ' s Annex Pawnshop in 
S a l t Lake Ci ty for $150 (T. 254, 257-258) . F lorez accompanied 
defendant and approached the shop owner about the s e l l i n g p r i ce 
for the VCR but t h e shop owner gave the $150 to defendant 
(T. 261-262, 263) . The VCR and a w a l l e t were s t o l e n from Paul 
V e l a s c o ' s Provo home in t h e e a r l y morning hours of November 14 , 
1984 (T. 245, 247) . Velasco valued the VCR a t $800 (T. 250) . 
When p o l i c e o f f i c e r s a r r e s t e d defendant , defendant sa id 
t h a t F lorez t o l d defendant t h a t F lorez took the VCR but Florez 
would not say from where (T. 272, 371) . Defendant sa id they 
rece ived $150 for the VCR and spent $30 (T. 273). Defendant had 
$120 when he was booked i n t o j a i l on November 14 , 1984, the same 
day t h a t he sold the VCR (T. 282-283) . 
Defendant admit ted t h a t he pawned t h e i tems t h a t were 
the b a s i s for the t h r ee counts of t h e f t and t h a t he pawned items 
for F lorez on seve ra l o ther occas ions (T. 366, 377 ) . He claimed, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t the d id not know or b e l i e v e t h a t the i tems 
were s t o l e n (T. 379) . 
- 3 -
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Defendant identified the pawn cards from several other 
specific pawn transactions (T. 390-399). He also admitted to 
using Paul Velasco's American Express Card to buy shoes and pants 
for himself (T. 382-383). Velasco's wallet was stolen in the 
November 14 incident (T. 244-245) . Defendant said he thought the 
credit card was stolen when he and Florez used it (T. 382). 
Thumbprints on all of the pawn cards matched defendant's 
thumbprint, without a doubt (T. 287, 292-3f 297). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Joinder was proper in this case because the three 
thefts by receiving were all part of a single criminal episode. 
The pawnshop transactions were identical in nature and involved 
stolen articles all received from a single source. The three 
counts were closely related in time and pursuant to a single 
criminal objective. 
Defendant did not provide a transcript of closing 
arguments in the record on appeal. This Court cannotf therefore, 
determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred during that 
argument. 
The jury instructions that the jury may presume 
knowledge or belief that the items probably were stolen did not 
create a mandatory rebuttable presumption. The instructions, 
when read together, could not have been interpreted as shifting 
the burden of proof to defendant by a reasonable juror. 
Defendant did not provide in the record evidence 
showing that he objected to Instructions 22 and 23 creating the 
permissive presumption. Without that record, he has waived the 
issue for appeal. 
-4-
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The pawn cards relating to pawn transactions other than 
those supporting the charges were properly admitted. Defendant 
himself provided the necessary foundation and the cards were 
relevant to show that, by the sheer number of identical pawn 
transactions, defendant knew or believed the property was stolen. 
Even if the cards should not have been admitted, it was harmless 
because the evidence had already come in through defendant's 
testimony to which defendant did not object nor move to strike. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JOINDER OF THE THREE OFFENSES IN THIS CASE 
WAS PROPER BECAUSE THEY WERE PART OF A 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
The question of whether offenses constitute a single 
criminal episode arises in two contexts. The first context is 
Double Jeopardy. There, a defendant may find himself erroneously 
charged with multiple offenses which are not only part of a 
single criminal episode but which are also based upon the "same 
act" as defined in the single criminal episode statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1978) A The second context is Joinder, the 
situation at hand. There a defendant feels either that his 
multiple offenses arising from separate acts should or should not 
1
 Section 76-1-402(1) provides: A defendant may be prosecuted in 
a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish 
offenses which may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only 
one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such 
provision. (Emphasis added). 
-5-
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have been joined for trial because they are or are not part of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 
(197 8) . 
The Utah cases cited by defendant in his brief at 6-9 
are all cases dealing with the double jeopardy or "same act" 
question. See e.g. State v. Bair. 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983); 
State Vt Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977); State v. Cornish, 
571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977). The issue raised by defendant, 
however, is joinder—whether the offenses charged were part of a 
single criminal episode so that they could properly be tried 
together. At first blush, the cases defendant cites appear to be 
relevant in that they purport to delineate what is a single 
criminal episode. Closer scrutiny, nevertheless, reveals that 
these cases do not support a conclusion that defendant's crimes 
were not part of a single criminal episode. 
In the cases cited above and cited in defendant's 
brief, the defendants argued that the multiple crimes charged 
were part of a single criminal episode and, therefore, claimed 
that to avoid double jeopardy they could only be prosecuted for 
one crime. This argument is flawed in that multiple acts, all 
part of a single criminal episode, san be the basis for multiple 
charges. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1978); State v. Porter r 
705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985). In two of these cases, the 
Court's ruling that there was no double jeopardy problem was, 
however, based on the preliminary conclusion that it was not even 
dealing with a single criminal episode. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Court's conclusions in Treland2and Cornish3 were 
based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 which provides: 
In this part unless the context requires a 
different definition, "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
This Court concluded that offenses committed as part of 
the escape attempts in these cases were not a part of a single 
criminal objective shared by the original crime the defendants 
were attempting to avoid. While in Ireland the Court found that 
the two acts were not close in time (separated by the time it 
took to drive 65 miles), the more critical aspect of the decision 
was that the acts were unrelated in objective (the hitchhikers 
were not picked up as hostages originally but only became 
hostages when the necessity to avoid capture arose). 
2
 In State v. Ireland. 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977), the defendant 
was stopped for speeding, pulled a gun, took the patrolman's gun, 
locked the patrolman in the trunk of the patrol car and left the 
scene. Later, Ireland picked up two hitchhikers, related what he 
had done and told them they did not have to remain with him. 
They rode on with Ireland and when police officers began 
following them, Ireland told the hitchhikers they were his 
hostages and held the gun on them. Ireland was convicted in 
Sevier County of kidnapping and in Beaver County for aggravated 
robbery. Ireland raised a double jeopardy claim that was 
rejected. 
3 
In State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d (Utah 1977) , the defendant stole a 
car. The next day, the stolen car, driven by Cornish, was 
spotted and a high-speed chase ensued. Cornish was convicted of 
car theft and failure to stop in separate prosecutions. He 
raised a double jeopardy claim that was rejected because the 
Court found the acts were not part of a single criminal episode. 
-7-
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In Cornish, the Court said that a one day separation 
between the crimes did not meet the "close in time" requirement 
but focused its attention mainly on the single objective aspect. 
There the Court determined that the objective of the escape 
attempt was not the same as the objective of stealing a car. 
The Court wanted to avoid irretrievably entangling crimes 
committed to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity with the 
original offense. 
The question remains whether the terms "closely related 
in time" and "single criminal objective" under § 76-1-401 should 
be limited by Ireland and Cornish. As noted above, Ireland and v 
Cornish mainly focus on whether the acts were the same act for 
double jeopardy purposes. The separation in time of one day or 
the time it takes to drive 65 miles do not appear to be such long 
periods of time that the acts were, per se
 f not closely related 
in time. It is also difficult to understand why an escape 
attempt to avoid prosecution for criminal activity is not part of 
a single criminal objective—i.e. getting away with the crime. 
Apparently, the Court and the parties confused the meanings of 
single criminal episode and "same act." They evidently reasoned 
that they could not find that a single criminal episode existed 
without also finding there was only one actf one crime. 
The focus of the case at bar, however, is 
distinguishable from that of Ireland and Cornish* Here, the 
defendant was charged with eight separate acts of theft by 
receiving and he has not raised a double jeopardy claim. Each 
act was fairly close in time and was accomplished under nearly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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identical circumstances and with a single criminal objective. 
Each time defendant was accused of pawning stolen articles, he 
did so at the request of Nelson Florez. They drove together from 
Provo to Salt Lake City, sometimes pawning articles in more than 
one pawnshop in a single day. Each time defendant gave an 
outdated address as his current address. The incidents forming 
the basis for the original eight charges were all within a four 
week period from October 20, 1984 to November 14, 1984 (R. 11-
 v 
13). While five of these charges were dismissed without 
prejudice at the preliminary hearing, they should all be taken 
into account when determining whether the three remaining charges 
were part of a single criminal episode.4 
State v, Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), cited by 
defendant, is also distinguishable from the case at hand. 
In ELaLlf the defendant was charged with multiple counts in two 
separate informations of theft by receiving stolen firearms which 
were all received by him simultaneously rather than on separate 
occasions. After acquittal in one case, defendant was tried on 
the second information and found guilty. He appealed on double 
jeopardy grounds. This Court held that not only was there a 
single criminal episode but also there was only one act of theft 
by receiving because the firearms were all received at one time. 
This Court held, as defendant points out, that it was the time of 
4
 It is not clear from the record exactly why the five charges 
were dismissed. At preliminary hearing, however, it appears that 
the State was prepared to proceed only on the three counts that 
were bound-over. See R. 9 at 759 (State's motion to continue); 
and see R. 6 at 1044 (State not ready to proceed). 
-9-
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receipt of the stolen goods by defendant that determines when 
theft by receiving occurred and not the time that the articles 
were taken from their true owners. 671 P.2d at 207. 
While Bair does support defendants contention that the 
acts charged here were not part of a single criminal episode, 
it appears that the Court's language in analyzing the single 
criminal episode statutes in H-aix is somewhat imprecise. 
The Court apparently ascribed to the phrase "single criminal 
episode" the same meaning ascribed to the phrase "the same act." 
This cannot have been the meaning the Legislature intended 
because § 76-1-40 2(1) clearly contemplates that several acts, 
constituting separate offenses, could be part of a single 
criminal episode. See also State v. Porter, 705 P.2d at 117 8. 
That the Court did equate "single criminal episode" and 
"same act" is evident from the following passage: 
In denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss, the trial court stated, "[Tlhe 
discovery at one time and place of numerous 
articles of property stolen at various times 
and places does not merge the preceding 
offenses into a single criminal episode." 
The court cited and relied upon the following 
rule of law: 
[R]eceiving or concealing different 
articles of stolen property at different 
times and on separate and unconnected 
occasions even though pursuant to a single 
scheme constitute separate offenses and 
cannot be prosecuted as one crime, in one 
count, even where all of the property is 
afterwards found in possession of the 
defendant at the same time and place. [66 
Am.Jur.2d Receiving Stolen Property § 14 
(1973). See also State v, Kuhnley, 74 Ariz. 
10, 242 p.2d 843 (1953); Hamilton v. State, 
129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937).] 
Application of the foregoing rule is 
specifically conditioned upon proof that the 
receipt of the different articles of stolen 
-10-
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property occurred "at different times and on 
separate and unconnected occasions," .anjuca. 
If the evidence does not satisfy this 
condition, but instead shows that the stolen 
articles were all received on one occasionf 
then the converse of the foregoing rule is 
truef i.e.f the receipt is considered a 
single offense and must be prosecuted as one 
crime. The relevance of this concept to the 
present issue regarding the single criminal 
episode should be obvious. If defendant's 
receipt of the various stolen guns occurred 
on only one occasion/ it definitely satisfied 
the "closely related in time" requirement of 
the single criminal episode statute, as well 
as the "single criminal objective" require-
ment thereof; whereas, if the receipt 
occurred on several occasions, such 
requirements are clearly not satisfied. 
Hair* 671 P.2d at 206 (emphasis added). The last sentence of this 
passage indicates that acts committed on several occasions cannot 
be part of a single criminal episode as defined in § 76-1-401 
because separate offenses are not closely related in time nor part 
of a single criminal objective unless they are the same act. This 
statement indicates that the Court equated single criminal episode 
with a single offense which is inconsistent with the meaning of § 
76-1-402(1). Section 76-1-402(1) read with § 76-1-401 clearly 
indicates that several offenses can be part of a single criminal 
episode if they are closely related in time (not necessarily the 
.same time) and part of a single criminal objective. 
The rule of law, quoted above, upon which the Court 
relied in fLaiXf points out that double jeopardy does not bar 
charging multiple counts for separate offenses which are all part 
of a "single scheme" (or single criminal episode). The Court's 
language indicates that it interpreted this rule to mean that the 
-11-
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presence of a single criminal episode always precludes multiple 
charges. A conclusion which is inconsistent with both § 76-1-
402(1) and State v. Porter. 705 P.2d at 117 8 (two acts of burglary 
in same building on same occasion part of single criminal episode 
but not same act)• 
The Court's language was: 
In light of the aforestated facts, [property 
received by defendant on one occasion] we 
conclude that the offenses allegedly 
committed by defendant for which he was 
prosecuted in the first and second (present) 
prosecutions were closely related in time and 
pursuant to a single criminal objective. 
Accordingly, we hold that the present 
prosecution is precluded by the single 
criminal episode statute, supra. 
ELfllx, 671 P.2d at 208. What the Court failed to include in this 
holding was that not only were the offenses closely related in 
time, they occurred at the .same time and were pursuant to a single 
criminal objective, thus, there was but one crime. Because there 
was only one crime, double jeopardy and § 76-1-402(1) precluded 
multiple charges and prosecutions for the "same act." Of course, 
indisputedly there was also a single criminal episode but that 
fact alone, without also the fact that there was only one act, 
would not preclude multiple charges. 
The relevance of the above discussion is that ELaix 
appears to stand in the way of a conclusion that there was a 
single criminal episode in this case because Haix appears to hold 
that only stolen articles received at the same time constitute a 
single criminal episode. In actuality, Jiaix stands for the 
proposition that stolen articles received at the same time 
constitute not only a single criminal episode but also constitute 
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only one act supporting a single charge of theft by receiving. 
This rule does not necessarily preclude finding several separate 
acts of theft by receiving to be part of a single criminal episode 
so long as they are close in time and pursuant to a single 
criminal objective. 
One reason for joining related charges is to avoid the 
inconvenience and the expense for the State and the accused in 
holding separate trials where the same or similar evidence is 
being presented. This reason, of course, does not override a 
defendant's due process right to a fair trial, however, so long as 
joinder does not prejudice a defendant in his ability to defend 
himself, joinder is appropriate, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9 (1982), 
and this Court will not overturn a denial of a motion to sever 
unless there was a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Saunders. 
699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). Defendant here was not prejudiced by 
joinder and there was no abuse of discretion. 
The evidence admitted on all three charges would have 
been admissible if the crimes were tried separately. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408(2)(b) creates a presumption that if a defendant 
has received other stolen goods within a year prior to the present 
charge, there is an inference that defendant knew the goods were 
stolen in this case. See also, State v. Slowef P.2d , 
slip op. at 3. (Utah Case No. 19990, 20070 filed December 30, 
1985). Because the evidence would have been admissible in any 
event, defendant was not prejudiced by joinder of the three 
charges in this case as was the defendant in Saunders. 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVIDE AN 
ADEQUATE RECORD UPON WHICH THE 
COURT MAY DETERMINE THE ISSUE 
OF ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor improperly argued 
in closing argument t ha t defendant 's pr ior burglary conviction 
demonstrated h is propensity to commit crimes. See Appel lant ' s 
Brief a t 14. Defendant did not f however, provide t h i s Court with 
a t r a n s c r i p t of the closing arguments on February 21 , 1985 as par t 
of the record on appeal . See Designation of Record on Appeal/ 
Appendix A. Without the t r a n s c r i p t , the Court i s unable to 
determine whether the comments a l legedly made were p r e j u d i c i a l . 
Defendant 's f a i l u re to provide an adequate record requires t h i s 
Court to "assume the regularity of the proceedings below and 
affirm the judgment." State v. Robbins. 21 Utah Adv. Rpt. 37, 38 
(Nov. 4, 1985) (citations omitted). 
POINT III 
THE JURY WAS NOT INSTRUCTED THAT THE 
§ 76-6-408 PRESUMPTION WAS A MANDATORY 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving 
certain jury instructions. The record does not indicate that 
defendant objected to these instructions and defendant merely 
claims that he objected to the instruction on other grounds argued 
in Point V below. Normally failure to make a specific objection 
to a jury instruction at trial precludes appellate review. Slats. 
v. Noren. 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985). But in State V» Lesley^ 672 
P.2d 79 (Utah 1983)r this Court reviewed a jury instruction in the 
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absence of an objection to avoid injustice. Should this Court 
choose to review the challenged instruction there was no error. 
The jury was given the following instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
The knowledge or belief which the State must 
prove is presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control of 
other property stolen on a separate occasion; or 
(b) Has received other stolen property within 
the year preceding the receiving offense charged. 
(R. 65) . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
The court has instructed you that you may 
presume Mr. Tarafa knew the property was 
stolen because he had received other stolen 
property within a year preceding these 
charges. This presumption is permissive in 
nature. That is, you may or may not employ 
it. The inference is also rebuttable. 
Mr. Tarafa1s testimony that he had no 
knowledge the property was stolen is offered 
to rebut the inference. It is for you to 
determine whether this evidence is sufficient 
to overcome the presumption of knowledge. 
The fact that an inference may arise and is 
or is not rebutted by evidence of the defendant 
in no way changes the burden of the state. 
The burden remains with the state to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Tarafa 
knew or believed the property was stolen. 
(R. 66). (Emphasis added). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2R 
If in these instructions any rule, direction 
or idea has been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must 
be inferred by you. For that reason, you are 
not to single out any certain sentence, or 
any individual point or instruction, and 
ignore the othersr but you are to consider 
all the instructions as a whole, and to regard 
each in the light of all the others. 
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The order in which the instructions are given 
has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
(R. 71) (Emphasis added). 
Defendant contends that Instruction No. 22 creates 
a mandatory rebuttable presumption like that disapproved in &£&££. 
v. Chambers, 20 Utah Adv. Rpt. 14 (Oct. 21, 1985). No doubt, 
Instruction No. 22 standing alone would improperly shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510 (1979). Read together with Instruction No. 23 and 28, how-
ever, it is evident that the presumption was permissive and did 
not shift the burden of proof. ^ 
In Francis v. Franklin, the Supreme Court stated: 
Analysis must focus initially on the 
specific language challenged, but the inquiry 
does not end there. If a specific portion of 
the jury charge, considered in isolation, 
could reasonably have been understood as 
creating a presumption that relieves the 
State of its burden of persuasion on an 
element of an offense, the potentially 
offending words must be considered in the 
context of the charge as a whole. Other 
instructions might explain the particular 
infirm language to the extent that a 
reasonable juror could not have considered 
the charge to have created an unconstitu-
tional presumption. Cupp v. Naughton, 414 
U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 
368 (1973). This analysis "requires careful 
attention to the words actually spoken to the 
jury . . . , for whether a defendant has been 
accorded his constitutional rights depends 
upon the way in which a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction. 
Sandstrom, £111113, 442 U.S., at 514, 99 S.Ct., 
at 2545. 
105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972 (1985). A reasonable juror could not have 
concluded that the jury instructions in this case, taken as a 
whole, created a mandatory rebuttable presumption. Instruction 
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No. 23 stated specifically that the presumption was permissive and 
that the burden remained on the State. Instruction No. 28 
instructed the jury to read all of the instructions as a whole. 
For these reasonsf no juror could have reached the conclusion that 
he must employ the presumption or that defendant was required to 
rebut it. 
Although defendant does not cite itf this Court decided 
State v. Pacheco. 20 Utah Adv. Rpt. 18 (Oct. 21f 1985) f after 
Chambers, While the Court in Pacheco only quoted the offending 
portion of the jury instruction, there was additional language in 
the instruction which the State argued cured the error. While the 
Pacheco instruction employed the phrase "prima facie" the 
instruction in this case did notf and they are not the same 
statutory presumption. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) 
(1978) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(2) (a) and (b) (1978). This 
difference in the basis of the instruction does not appear 
significant. There is, therefore, only one way in which the State 
can square this case with Pacheco and square Pacheco with Francis 
v. Franklin. That is to assume that Pacheco is to be read no more 
expansively than is Chambers, There was, therefore, no error in 
instructing the jury in this case. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NOT AN ADEQUATE RECORD SHOWING 
THAT DEFENDANT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL HIS 
OBJECTION TO THE COURT GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NOS. 22 AND 23. 
Defendant argues that the jury should not have been 
instructed on the presumption of knowledge found in § 76-6-408, 
and outlined in Instructions 22 and 23 quoted in Point III above, 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because there was no evidence supporting the presumption. 
He further asserts that he objected to the instruction at trial. 
Defendant did not provide a sufficient record to 
support the claim that he preserved his objection to the 
instruction for appeal. He requested for the record only a 
transcript of the trial on February 19-20, 1985 (R. 120). 
This transcript does not include the objection he claims he 
raised. Without an adequate record of an objection, this Court 
should assume the regularity of the proceedings below and should 
not assume that the issue was preserved for appeal. State v. 
Robbins. 21 Utah Adv. Rpt. 37, 38 (Nov. 4, 1985). Because he 
failed to provide an adequate record, defendant has waived this 
issue on appeal. Id. 
This Court has, however, reviewed errors in jury 
instructions in the absence of an objection where it would be 
manifestly unjust to deny review. State v. Lesleyf 672 P.2d 79 
(Utah 1983). If the Court chooses to review the challenged 
instruction, there was no error. 
Defendant admitted that he participated in using Paul 
Velasco's stolen credit card to purchase shoes and pants for 
himself. Use of this credit card could satisfy part (b) of 
Instruction 22—receipt of other stolen property within the year 
preceding the receiving offense charged. 
Furthermore, each count of receiving stolen property 
could raise an inference that defendant knew the other property 
was stolen. This is especially true where defendant said he knew 
Florez "took" the VCR which was the basis for count III. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED PAWN 
CARDS THAT RELATED TO OTHER PAWN 
TRANSACTIONS INTO EVIDENCE. 
On cross-examination, defendant identified seven pawn 
cards from transactions other than those that were the basis for 
the three charges tried in this case. He admitted that he signed 
the cards and provided the information, including thumbprints, 
which the cards contained (T. 3 90-399) . He also explained that 
all of these pawn transactions were done by him for Nelson Florez 
in the same manner as those for which he was on trial. All of the 
transactions took place within the same time frame as the three 
theft charges. They were on October 27, 3 0 and 31 and November 3, 
5 and 6 (See Ex. P-18-24). 
Defense counsel did not object to defendant's testimony 
concerning these transactions. When the State moved for admission 
of the cards as evidence (Ex. P-18-24), defense counsel objected 
to admission of the cards because they lacked foundation and 
relevance (T. 426). The trial court admitted the cards, ruling 
that foundation was established by defendant's own testimony and 
that they were relevant (T. 426). 
Because defense counsel did not object to defendant's 
testimony, the evidence which he claims was prejudicial had 
already come in and could be considered by the jury. Moreover, 
the specific facts surrounding these pawn transactions merely 
corroborated defendant's direct testimony that he had pawned items 
for Florez on at least 7 or 8 occasions (T. 366). Thus, even if 
the pawn cards themselves were erroneously admitted, their 
admission was harmless. 
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This Court has held t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on 
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence w i l l not be over tu rned u n l e s s the cour t 
so abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n as t o c r e a t e a l i k e l i h o o d t h a t i n j u s t i c e 
r e s u l t e d . S t a t e v . Roybal l r 17 Utah Adv. Rp t . 16 (Sep t . 3 f 1985) . 
There was no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n where t h e evidence had a l r eady 
come in through d e f e n d a n t ' s t es t imony and defendant d id not o b j e c t 
t o t h e tes t imony nor move t o s t r i k e i t . 
Notab ly , a l though defendant a rgues t h a t the pawn ca rds 
were admit ted as evidence of p r i o r bad a c t s , he a l so a rgues t h a t 
t h e r e was no evidence t h a t any of t h e s e i tems were s t o l e n (See 
A p p e l l a n t ' s Br ief a t 2 7 - 2 8 ) . I f none of the i tems were shown t o \ 
be s t o l e n then pawning them was not a "bad a c t . " Thus, even i f 
t h e judge had excluded evidence of p r i o r bad a c t s , t h e p rosecu to r 
would no t have v i o l a t e d the order by o f f e r i n g t h i s evidence as 
defendant c la ims he d i d . Notwi ths tanding d e f e n d a n t ' s c la im to 
the c o n t r a r y , the j udge , in f a c t , d id r u l e t h a t t h i s evidence 
could come in t o rebut d e f e n d a n t ' s c la im t h a t he did not know nor 
d id not b e l i e v e t h a t the p rope r ty probably was s t o l e n (T. 151 ) . 
The sheer number of pawn t r a n s a c t i o n s under s i m i l a r c i r cumstances 
was of fe red to show t h a t defendant d id in f ac t know or b e l i e v e 
t h a t t h e i tems were s t o l e n . For t h i s reason t h e evidence was 
r e l e v a n t and the t r i a l cour t d id not e r r in a d m i t t i n g i t . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e fo rego ing , t he S t a t e r e q u e s t s t h i s Court 
t o aff i rm d e f e n d a n t ' s conv i c t i on and deny h i s r e q u e s t for a new 
t r i a l . 
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DATED this /7# day of January, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^pftxdw ^ p ^ V 
(//SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
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a t t o r n e y for a p p e l l a n t , S a l t Lake Legal Defender A s s o c i a t i o n , 333 
South Second E a s t , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111, t h i s day of 
J a n u a r y , 1986 
^fa/#f / . *^&»frt6«/ 
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NANCY BERGESON (#303) ,. ' 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 \ Jl 
PILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MAR 18 1985 
HIBixon Hindley, Cte% 3rd Dist 
6 
Deputy Oie& 
IN THE DISTRIQTytDURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
ROBERTO TARAFA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
DESIGNATION OF RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
Case No. CR 85-54 
(Judge Frederick) 
TO THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY: 
You are hereby requested to prepare, certify and transmit 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, with reference to the 
Notice of Appeal heretofore filed by the defendant/appellant, in 
the above cause, all documents contained in the file in the 
above-entitled matter, together with a transcript of the entire 
record of the hearing held on the 19th and 20th days of February, 
19 8 5 and the Motion to Sever heard on the 15th day of February, 
1985, before the Honorable J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge, Third 
District Court. 
,i. 0 DATED th: day of March, 1985. 
NANCY BERGESON/ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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